Wyoming Law Journal
Volume 8
Number 3 Legal Problems Relating to Wyoming
Youth

Article 6

December 2019

The Status of Legal Abandonment in Wyoming
Leonard J. Georges

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlj

Recommended Citation
Leonard J. Georges, The Status of Legal Abandonment in Wyoming, 8 WYO. L.J. 205 (1954)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlj/vol8/iss3/6

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Wyoming Law Journal by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship.

WYOMING LAW JOURNAL
NO. 3

SPRING, 1951

VOL. 8

STUDENT EDITORIAL BOARD
JAMES A. TILKER
WILLIAM E. FOSTER
MERLE B. CAsr

THOS. J. FAGAN
GLENN W. BUNPY
ROBERT L. DUNCAN

G. J. CARDINE, Editor-in-Chief
RICHARD I. LEEDY, Business Manager

FRANK

J.

FACULTY ADVISORS
E. GEORGE

TRELEASE

RUDOLPII

Published in the Fall, Winter, and Spring
by the
University of Wyoming School of Law
and the Wyoming State Bar
Subscription Price $2.00 per year; 75c per copy
Mailing Address: College of Law; University of Wyoming,
Laramie, Wyoming.
NOTES
THE STATUS OF LEGAL ABANDONMENT

IN WYOMING

Of the 75,000 annual adoptions in the United States,1 an undetermined number are those in which a child has been adopted without the
consent of one or both of its living parents. More than 275,000 not "up
for adoption" are being cared for in public and private institutions. 2 Some
will stay from six months to two years; others, whose parents are unwilling
or unable to establish a home, will remain throughout their childhood.
In situations such as this, consent of the natural parents, in most states,
may be dispensed with where, at some stage of the adoption proceedings,
a court finds that the child has been abandoned.3
In some jurisdictions, abandonment has been defined wholly or in
part by statute. So, for example, it is provided in one jurisdiction that if,
without excuse, neither parent contributes to the child's support for six
4
months, the person who has its lawful custody may consent to its adoption.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Dec. 1953 Ladies Home Journal, page 25.
Dec. 1953 Ladies Home Journal, page 25.
1 Am. Jur. 643, Sec. 42.
See Watts v. Dull, 184 1L 86, 56 N.E. 303 (1900).
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Although there are statutes in Wyoming that recognize abandonment, 5
there is no statutory definition, and the issue of abandonment becomes one
of court interpretation.
In an early Wyoming case, 6 the court held that the parent who may
relinquish the child or consent to its adoption is a parent who still
possesses a right to take care, custody or control of the child. The mother
had consented to the adoption.. The court found that the father who had,
nine months after the birth of the child, left his wife and their four
children without means of support and in circumstances of extreme destitution, and who had never, up to the time of the adoption proceeding, (a
period of three years and five months) contributed to the support of his
wife and children except the sum of twenty dollars, had abandoned the
child. Abandonment, said the court, is simply the evidentiary fact which
proves the ultimate fact of relinquishment; in other words, the relinquishment of one's rights is the effect and result of one's abandonment of those
rights either by deed or other instrument in writing, or by parol or by
turning the child out of the house.
One other Wyoming case, decided in 1948, considered the question of
what circumstances were sufficient to constitute abandonment. 7 The
father of two girls left them in the care of his mother (the girls' grandmother). Just before leaving for Alaska, and upon visiting his mother,
he found that the daughters were staying with neighbors. There was
evidence that he visited the neighbors and made it known that he considered the girls to be only in the neighbors' temporary custody. For two
years and two months thereafter he neither wrote nor sent money for the
support of the children. During this time the neighbors served the father
by publication and adopted the children.8 The court held that the
evidence was insufficient to show that the father had abandoned the
children. By way of definition the court said:
"Abandonment imports any conduct on the part of the parent
which evinces a settled purpose to forgo all parental duties and
relinquish all parental claims to the child. 9 .. . Abandonment
involves more than a temporary absence or temporary neglect of
5.

Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, Sec. 58-213, 58-215, 58-101, 58-108, 58-606, 9-801, 9-802
(Abandonment), 58-214, 58-113, 58-501 (Desertion). "Desertion" and "abandonment"
will be considered as synonymous for the purpose of this article, but the writer
recognizes contra authority. See Bowling v. State, 62 Ga. App. 540, 8 S.E.2d 697

6.
7.
9.

Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo. 173, 33 Pac. 23 (1893).
Lucas v. Strauser, 65 Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862 (1948).
Thxe ixatuyal fatxev vve.Dpxed the adoptian procetdin7, undeir W'jo. Cotxp. Stat.
1945, Sec. 3-3802, which, at that time, (April, 1947) allowed any party against
whom a judgment or order was rendered without service other than by publication
in a newspaper, three years after the judgment or order, in which to re-open such
judgment or order. The legislature changed this three years to six months effective on May 23, 1947. This was a good change so far as adoption is concerned, in
that the time to attack the judgment or order is cut considerably, but note that
an adoption decree is only as good as any other judgment. See: Wyo. Comp. Stat.
1945, Sec. 3-3801, Sec. 3-3805, Sec. 3-3810. Also, see Schmelling v. Hoffman, 111
Wash. 408, 191 Pac. 618 (1926).
Citing Winans v. Luppie, 47 N.J.Eq. 302, 20 A. 969 (1890).

9.

(1940).
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parental duties.1 0 . . . There must evidence from which it
may be inferred that the parent did not intend to reserve the
right to retain the children.' 1 . . ."
"It was his (the father's) 2duty to decide where the children were
to be kept and care for.' . . ."
"Of course the failure of a parent to send money for the support
of his children may in some circumstances be quite important in
the issue of abandonment. . . . It is of little or no importance if
the persons in temporary care of the children are volunteers, who
expect no assistance from the parents."
Where the parent whose consent was not obtained does not later object,
and where he had voluntarily absented himself from the child for a considerable period of time, had contributed little or nothing to the child's
support during his abence, and had not attempted to assert any parental
13
rights during his absence, a case of abandonment will be made out.
But Lucas v. Strauser tells us that where the non-consenting parent
does later object, then even if the notice required by Section 58-207 has
been published, a finding of abandonment will not be sustained unless:
(1) Those asserting abandonment sustain the burden of proving it by
"clear and convincing" evidence,
(2) The parent's conduct has evinced "a settled purpose to forego all
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child,"
(3) The parent's absence or neglect of parental duty is permanent
rather than temporary,
(4) The parent did not intend to resrve the right to reclaim the child.
Lucas v. Strauser also tells us that the following circumstances, taken
either separately or together, are not sufficient of themselves to constitute
abandonment:
(1) Leaving a young child in the care of others,
(2) Not communicating in any way with the child, or those in whose
care the child was left, for as long a time as twenty-six months,
(3) Completely failing to contribute to the support of the child for
as long as twenty-six months, even though the parent was financially able
to do so, especially when volunteers have agreed to care for the child
without pay.
The Lucas case obviously makes it very difficult to prove abandonment
in Wyoming. How do its result and reasoning compare with decisions in
other jurisdictions?
10.
11.
12.

Citing Smith v. Smith, 67 Ida. 349, 180 P.2d 853 (1947); In re Snowball's Estate,
156 Cal. 240, 104 Pac. 444 (1909).
Citing 2 C.J.S. 21.
Citing Biggs v. State, 13 Wyo. 94, 77 Pac. 901 (1904).

13.

Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo. 173, 33 Pac. 23 (1893).
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This has been a problem in other states as well.
14
circumstances have led to different results.

Varying sets of

The consent of the natural parent or surviving parent to an adoption
proceeding is quite uniformly required in the statutes of the various states.
The consent of the natural parents, it is said, "lies at the foundation of
adoption statutes."' 15
According to some authorities, "abandonment" is not synonymous
non-support may
with "non-support" under adoption statutes, 16 although
17
be an important factor in establishing abandonment.
Some courts will find abandonment only in extreme cases. For
instance, in an early Utah case,18 a seventeen year old unmarried mother
gave consent to an arrangement for giving her child, at birth, to third
parties in order to avoid disgrace and because of iroportunings of the
maternal grandmother. The court, in trying to give an expression as to
the type of abandonment intended to exist in order to sever parental ties,
said:
"Abandonment ordinarily means that a parent has placed the
child on some doorstep or left it in some convenient place in the
hope that someone will find it and take charge of it, or has
abandoned it entirely to chance or fate."
In a recent Idaho case, 19 the natural mother, after marital difficulties
which resulted in a separation from her husband, voluntarily entrusted her
minor children to their maternal grandmother. She then went to California and was not in contact with her parents either through the mails
or by telephone, and they did not know where she was for about four
months.
The grandmother became ill and delivered one of the children to the
custody of third persons who were hopeful of adoption.
The mother, who was still in California, was indicted and pleaded
guilty to a morals charge. The court placed her on probation to her parents
in Idaho. Upon returning to Idaho, she learned, for the first time, of the
14.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See: Yale L.J. Vol. 60, page 1240. Also, In re Sanders, 88 Cal. App.2d 551, 198 P.2d
523 (1948), in which the evidence established that mother of a minor child had
"abandoned" the child by her failure to provide for, or communicate with, him
for a period of one year. The Lucas v. Strauser case found no abandonment for
failure to provide or communicate for over two years.
In re Jackson, 55 Nev. 174, 28 P.2d 125, 91 A.L.R. 1381 (1934).
Smith v. Smith, 67 Ida. 549, 180 P.2d 853 (1947).
Lucas v. Strauser, 65.Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862 (1948).
Jensen v. Early, 63 Utah 604, 228 Pac. 217 (1924). Although an early decision, it is
still upheld. See Worthen et ux v. Walton, 259 P.2d 881 (Utah, 1953).
Moss v. Vest, 262 P.2d 116 (Ida., 1953). Supreme Court reversed the lower court's
finding of abandonment, but allowed third parties to retain custody of the child,
on the grounds that: "As a general rule where a parent seeking the custody of a
child is guilty of immor"l conduct of such a gross chraacter that the welfare of the
child might be endangered in awarding such custody, it will be denied to the
parent until at least such time as the parent has reformed to an extent sufficient
to remove the danger to the best welfare of the child. 67 C.J.S., Parent and Child,
para. 12, p. 61."

NOTES

adoption proceeding and brought a habeas corpus for the return of her
son.
The court said:
"She did not desert and abandon her children when she placed
them in the care of her own parents whom she knew had a good
home and were able to properly provide for them. . . . She never,
at any time, intended to entirely forsake, utterly renounce and
absolutely give them up and evince a settled purpose to forever
foergo her parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to her
children.
"There can be no abandonment without a specific intent to sever
all correlative rights and duties incident to the relationship of
parent and child. The evidence must be but, in this case, is far
from clear, satisfactory, decisive or convincing that she intended
to abandon and desert the children at the time the custody was
given to her mother or at any time thereafter."
On the other hand, in a New York case, 20 where a mother left her
child with a stranger, agreeing to pay its board, but did not do so, and
was absent from the United States for over one year, she was held to have
abandoned the child.
However, a heavy burden of proof rests upon those seeking to establish
abandonment, and the court resolves all doubts in the natural parents'
21
favor.
The importance to the courts of preserving the natural parent-child
relationship is clearly pointed up when one considers the well established
concept that custody may be awarded to others in a proper case 22 and that
the welfare of the child is of great importance, but quite immaterial in
adoption cases until consent or an effective abandonment of parental rights
23
is shown.
It is understood that under the due process clause, serious constitutional
impedimenta would looni if an indiscriminate sanction of dispossession of
parental rights without consent were attempted. 24 On the other hand,
there must be some type of finality to adoption proceedings in order that
adoptive parents will not be put on an "anxious seat" or involved in a lawsuit. To strike a balance between these sometimes conflicting pressures
in the law relating to abandonment challenges the best powers of our
lawmakers and courts.
In conclusion, in Wyoming adoption through abandonment, dispens20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Matter of Larson, 31 Han. 539 (1884); See, also, Richards v. Matteson, 8 S.D. 77,
65 N.W. 428 (1895).
See People ex rel. Cucuzza v. Cobb, 94 N.Y.S.2d 616 (1950). Those asserting abandonment failed to meet the burden of proof.
Morris, Jr. v. Jackson, 66 Wyo. 369, 212 P.2d 78 (1949).
7 Wyo. L.J. 41 (Fall, 1952) Adoption Without Parental Consent, to Better the
Children's Welfare.
Worthen et ux v. Walton, 259 P.2d 881 (Utah, 1953).
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ing with consent, as it now stands, is of very doubtful value. There is no
standard whatsoever by which one might have any reasonable assurance
that once the child is placed, it won't be upset by a direct or collateral
proceedings, resulting in the setting aside of an adoption based on abandonment.
LEONARD J.

ADMINISTRATIVE

PROBLEMS

RELATING To

GEORGES

ADOPTION

There are three interests which are sometimes conflicting, and which
vie for attention in adoption cases: the welfare of the child, the interests of
the natural parents, and the interests of the prospective adoptive parents.
From the viewpoint of those public officials who have the primary responsibility for administering our adoption laws (the District Judge, the
County Attorney, and the County Welfare Department) the over-all
problem of synthesizing thsee three sometimes conflicting interests subdivides itself into a number of puzzling administrative problems. The
topics discussed in this article are those suggested as a result of conferences
with the County and Prosecuting Attorney for Albany County, Mr. Gordon
Davis; the District Judge for the second Judicial District of the State of
Wyoming, Judge Glenn Parker; and the head of the Albany County Welfare
Department, Miss E. Berniece Brown.
Before particular administrative problems are discussed it would be
well to take a bird's eye view of the adoption process as a whole. Footnote
references are to Wyoming Compiled Statutes, 1945, and pocket supplement,
unless otherwise indicated.
Adoptions may be initiated in either of two ways: by the natural
parents' or by the prospective adoptive parents. 2 Proceedings are commenced by the filing of a petition in the district court showing a desire to
relinquish all right to the child on the part of the natural parents, or, when
the adopting parents are the petitioners, a showing that they wish to adopt
the child.
There are various statutory provisions covering the adoption of an
abandoned child:
1. If the abandoning parents consent to the adoption of a child, then
he may be adopted, assuming that the District Judge finds the welfare of
the child will be promoted thereby. The word "parent" as used in Section
58-201 includes any children's home or society having custody of the child,
and such organizations have the same privilege of consent as the natural
parents whenever there are no known natural parents. 3
1.
2.
3.

58-201.
58-202.
58-201 and 58-202.

